Information Spectrum Approach to Strong Converse Theorems for Degraded
  Wiretap Channels by Tan, Vincent Y. F. & Bloch, Matthieu R.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
6.
67
58
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
26
 Se
p 2
01
4
1
Information Spectrum Approach to Strong Converse
Theorems for Degraded Wiretap Channels
Vincent Y. F. Tan† and Matthieu R. Bloch‡
Abstract—We consider block codes for degraded wiretap
channels in which the legitimate receiver decodes the message
with an asymptotic error probability no larger than ε but the
leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes. For discrete memoryless
and Gaussian wiretap channels, we show that the maximum rate
of transmission does not depend on ε ∈ [0, 1), i.e., such chan-
nels possess the partial strong converse property. Furthermore,
we derive sufficient conditions for the partial strong converse
property to hold for memoryless but non-stationary symmetric
and degraded wiretap channels. Our proof techniques leverage
the information spectrum method, which allows us to establish a
necessary and sufficient condition for the partial strong converse
to hold for general wiretap channels without any information
stability assumptions.
Index Terms—Strong converse, Information spectrum method,
Degraded wiretap channels, Information-theoretic security
I. INTRODUCTION
In many modern signal processing applications [1], such
as credit card transactions, health informatics and device-to-
device communications, a sender wishes to transmit confi-
dential information to a legitimate receiver, while keeping
the information private or secret from a malicious party—
the so-called eavesdropper. This problem is well-studied in
information-theoretic security [2], [3] and is known as the
wiretap channel model [4] as shown in Fig. 1. The task is to
reliably communicate a message M ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉} from
the sender X to the legitimate receiver Y while keeping the
eavesdropper Z ignorant of M . The secrecy capacity for the
wiretap channel W : X → Y × Z is the supremum of all
rates R for which there exists a code that is reliable, i.e.,
Y can reconstruct M with probability tending to one as the
blocklength n tends to infinity, and secure, i.e., the normalized
mutual information (leakage rate) of the message and the
eavesdropper’s signal 1
n
I(M ;Zn) is arbitrarily small as n
grows. Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity of a degraded
(i.e., X − Y −Z forms a Markov chain) discrete memoryless
wiretap channel is
max
PX
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) bits per channel use. (1)
This result was generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [5] to non-
degraded channels.
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In this paper, we relax the reliability condition of the
wiretap code. More precisely, we allow the wiretap code
to be such that the legitimate receiver decodes the message
M with an asymptotic error probability bounded above by
ε ∈ [0, 1). The wiretap code, however, must ensure that M
and Zn are asymptotically independent and just as in Bloch
and Laneman [6], we consider six measures of asymptotic
independence of varying strengths. We show that for many
classes of degraded, memoryless wiretap channels, the ε-
secrecy capacity (maximum code rate R such that the error
probability is asymptotically no larger than ε) does not depend
on ε. In other words, the ε-secrecy capacity is not larger than
the expression in (1) in which it is assumed that the error
probability of decoding M vanishes asymptotically. Because
we still ask that the leakage rate vanishes with the blocklength,
we say that a partial strong converse holds.
A. Related Work
In the majority of the information-theoretic security litera-
ture [2], [3], only weak converse statements are established,
typically using Fano’s inequality. However, some progress has
been made in recent works to establish strong converses. For
example, the authors of [7]–[9] proved strong converses for
the multi-party secret key agreement problem and other related
problems. In particular, the authors of [8], [9] proved that the
secret key capacity does not depend on the error bound ε and
the secrecy bound δ (measured according to the variational
distance) as long as ε + δ < 1. Another related work is the
one by Morgan and Winter [10, Sec. VI] who used one-shot
bounds in [11] to establish a so-called pretty strong converse
for the private capacity of a degradable quantum channel.
Specifically, they prove that the that private capacity does not
depend on the error bound ε and the secrecy bound δ as long as√
ε+2
√
δ < 1/2.1 In the present paper, we only prove a strong
converse for (ε, δ) ∈ [0, 1) × {0} and a comparison of the
results from various related works is shown in Fig. 2. There is
substantial motivation to prove strong converses because such
statements indicate that there exists a sharp phase transition
between rates that are achievable and those that are not.
Codes with unachievable rates have error probabilities that
1To be more precise, the authors in [10, Thm. 14] used results
in [11] to prove that the private capacity does not depend on ε′ and δ′,
both measured in terms of the purified distance dpur(P,Q) :=
[
1 −
(
∑
x(P (x)Q(x))
1/2)2
]1/2
, as long as ε′ + 2δ′ < 1/
√
2. This can be
translated to the true average error probability ε and the variational distance
δ using the bounds ε′ ≤ √2ε and δ′ ≤ √2δ (e.g. [12, Thm. 1]). Thus, one
obtains the strong converse condition
√
ε+2
√
δ < 1/2 (albeit conservative)
in terms of the error probability and variational distance.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the wiretap channel model. The decoding error
probability must satisfy lim supn→∞ Pr(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ ε while the leakage
Si(PMZn , PM × PZn ) (measured according to any one of the six secrecy
metrics in Definition 1) must vanish as n grows.
tend to one (or a positive number strictly less than one for the
pretty strong converse) as the blocklength grows. Unlike weak
converses, the rates are not simply bounded away from zero.
For point-to-point channel coding, Wolfowitz established the
strong converse in the 1950s [13], but little attention has been
paid to strong converses for information-theoretic problems
with secrecy constraints, such as the wiretap channel.
B. Summary Of Our Approach
In this work, we adopt the information spectrum
method [14]–[16] to make strong converse statements for
various classes of degraded wiretap channels. The information
spectrum method, developed by Verdu´ and Han [14], [15],
is a systematic and powerful method to characterize the
fundamental limits of communication systems without the
usual assumptions of memorylessness, stationarity, ergodicity
and information stability. The information spectrum method is
also useful in establishing necessary and sufficient conditions
for the strong converse to hold [16, Sec. 3.5] which is one of
the reasons why we have adopted this approach. The use of the
information spectrum approach for general wiretap channels
was pioneered by Hayashi in [17] in which the use of channel
resolvability [15] [16, Sec. 6.3] was shown to be a useful
coding mechanism for secrecy.
C. Main Contributions
In this work, we establish that the degraded discrete mem-
oryless (and stationary) wiretap channel (DM-WTC) admits
a partial strong converse. This means that regardless of the
permissible asymptotic error probability ε ∈ [0, 1), if the leak-
age vanishes asymptotically, the maximum rate of transmission
cannot exceed the secrecy capacity Wyner derived in (1). This
contribution is a strengthening of Wyner’s seminal result [4].
We extend our result to prove the same for the Gaussian
wiretap channel (G-WTC), strengthening the capacity result
by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [18]. Finally, we prove
that the partial strong converse holds for some classes of non-
stationary wiretap channels.
D. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we state the
notational conventions, describe the system model and define
✻
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Fig. 2. The strong converses for the degraded DM-WTC (Theorem 3) and
G-WTC (Theorem 5) hold for (ε, δ) on the blue strip [0, 1)×{0} (i.e., partial
strong converse). Here, ε denotes the error probability and δ the variational
distance defined in (2). Morgan and Winter’s [10, Thm. 14] pretty strong
converse for the private capacity of degradable quantum channels holds for√
ε+2
√
δ < 1/2, indicated by the region in red. Tyagi and Watanabe’s strong
converse for the secret key capacity [9, Cor. 11] holds for ε+δ < 1, indicated
by the union of the cyan, red and blue regions. This result improves on Tyagi
and Narayan’s strong converse for the same problem [7, Sec. VII] which holds
for (ε, δ) ∈ [0, 1)×{0}. We caution that these information-theoretic security
problems are different so the results are not directly comparable.
the partial strong converse property for the wiretap channel.
In Section III, we state our main results. In particular, after
recapitulating some information spectrum quantities in Section
III-A, we state general formulas for the ε-secrecy capacity
and its optimistic version in Section III-B. These are done
for arbitrary wiretap channels where the legitimate receiver
is allowed to make an error with probability not exceeding
ε ∈ [0, 1) but the leakage is required to tend to zero. The bulk
of the contributions is contained in Section III-C where we
present strong converse results for specific channel models
such as the DM-WTC and the G-WTC. We conclude and
suggest avenues for future research in Section IV. The proofs
of the theorems are contained in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we state our notation and the definitions of
the various problems we consider in this paper.
A. Basic Notations
Random variables (e.g., X) and their realizations (e.g., x)
are denoted by upper case and lower case serif font, respec-
tively. Sets are denoted in calligraphic font (e.g., the alphabet
of X is X ). We use the notation Xn to denote a vector of
random variables (X1, . . . , Xn). In addition, X = {Xn}n∈N
is a general source in the sense that each member of the
sequence Xn = (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
n ) is a random vector. The
consistency condition (i.e., X(n)i = X(m)i for all m < n and
1 ≤ i ≤ m) need not hold. A general broadcast channel
W = {Wn : Xn → Yn×Zn}n∈N is a sequence of stochastic
3mappings from Xn to Yn×Zn. The set of all probability dis-
tributions with support on an alphabet X is denoted as P(X ).
We use the notation X ∼ PX to mean that the distribution of
X is PX . The joint distribution formed by the product of the
input distribution PX ∈ P(X ) and the channel W : X → Y
is denoted by PX ×W . Information-theoretic quantities are
denoted using the notations in Han’s book [16], e.g., H(X)
for entropy, I(X ;Y ) for mutual information and D(P‖Q) for
relative entropy. All logarithms are to an arbitrary base. We
also use the discrete interval notation [i : j] := {i, . . . , j}.
The variational distance between two measures or distribu-
tions P and Q on the same space X is defined as
V(P,Q) := sup
A⊂X
∣∣P (A)−Q(A)∣∣, (2)
where A ⊂ X runs over the class of measurable subsets of
X . For an arbitrary sample space X , the definition of the
variational distance in (2) is equivalent to
V(P,Q) =
1
2
∫
X
∣∣p(x)− q(x)∣∣ dλ(x), (3)
where λ is a common dominating measure of P and Q and
p(x) = dP/dλ and q(x) = dQ/dλ denote their respective
densities. Furthermore, V(P,Q) = P (A∗) − Q(A∗) where
A∗ = {x : p(x) ≥ q(x)}.
The probability density function of the normal distribution
N (y;µ, σ2) is defined as
N (y;µ, σ2) := 1√
2πσ2
exp
(
− (y − µ)
2
2σ2
)
. (4)
B. System Model
We consider a general wiretap channel, which is simply a
general broadcast channel W = {Wn : Xn → Yn×Zn}n∈N.
Terminal X denotes the sender, terminal Y denotes the le-
gitimate receiver, and terminal Z denotes the eavesdropper.
We would like to reliably transmit a message M from the
terminal X to terminal Y , and at the same time, design
the code such that terminal Z , the eavesdropper, obtains
no information about M . More precisely, the eavesdropper’s
signal or observation Zn is required to be asymptotically
independent of M . There are various ways to quantify asymp-
totic independence. We adopt the methodology of Bloch and
Laneman [6] and consider six metrics of varying strengths that
quantify asymptotic independence.
Definition 1. Let η > 0 be an arbitrary constant, P := PMZn ,
Q := PM × PZn and (M,Zn) ∼ P . Consider the following
measures of independence, also known as secrecy metrics:
S1(P,Q) := D(P‖Q), (5)
S2(P,Q) := V(P,Q), (6)
S
η
3(P,Q) := Pr
(
log
P (M,Zn)
Q(M,Zn)
> η
)
, (7)
S4(P,Q) :=
1
n
D(P‖Q), (8)
S5(P,Q) :=
1
n
V(P,Q), (9)
S
η
6(P,Q) := Pr
( 1
n
log
P (M,Zn)
Q(M,Zn)
> η
)
. (10)
Because D(P‖Q) = D(PMZn‖PM × PZn) = I(M ;Zn)
the mutual information, secrecy metrics S1 and S4 correspond
to strong [19], [20] and weak secrecy [4] respectively. These
are the most common metrics in the information-theoretic
security literature [2], [3]. We say that Si dominates Sj if
Si(PMZn , PM × PZn) → 0 implies that Sj(PMZn , PM ×
PZn) → 0 and we denote this by Si  Sj . Bloch and
Laneman [6, Prop. 1] showed that there exists an ordering of
the above six secrecy metrics. In particular, for any η1, η2 > 0,
S1  S2  Sη13  S4  S5  Sη26 . (11)
Given the wiretap channel W = {Wn}n∈N, we define its
Yn- and Zn-marginals as
WnY (y|x) :=
∑
z∈Zn
Wn(y, z|x), and (12)
WnZ(z|x) :=
∑
y∈Yn
Wn(y, z|x), (13)
where (x,y, z) ∈ Xn × Yn ×Zn is a tuple of vectors.
Definition 2. An (n,Mn, εn, δn)-wiretap code for secrecy
metric i ∈ [1 : 6] consists of (see Fig. 1)
1) A message set Mn = [1 : Mn];
2) A stochastic encoder QXn|M :Mn → Xn and
3) A decoder ϕn : Yn →Mn
such that the average error probability satisfies
1
Mn
∑
m∈Mn
∑
x∈Xn
QXn|M (x|m)WnY (Yn \ ϕ−1n (m)|x) ≤ εn
(14)
and the information leakage satisfies
Si(PMZn , PM × PZn) ≤ δn (15)
where M ∈ Mn is the message random variable which is
uniformly distributed over Mn.
We remark that secrecy metrics Sη3 and S
η
6 depend on an
additional parameter η > 0 but to simplify notation, we do not
make the dependence of the code on η explicit. This should
not cause any confusion in the sequel.
We now define achievable rates and capacities for the
general wiretap channel.
Definition 3. Let ε ∈ [0, 1) and i ∈ [1 : 6]. Let R ∈ R be
called an (ε, i)-achievable rate for the general wiretap channel
W if there exists a sequence of (n,Mn, εn, δn)-wiretap codes
for secrecy metric i such that
lim sup
n→∞
εn ≤ ε, lim
n→∞
δn = 0, and lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R.
(16)
Define the (ε, i)-secrecy capacity (or simply (ε, i)-capacity) of
the wiretap channel W as
C(i)ε (W) := sup{R : R is (ε, i)-achievable}. (17)
Define the (i)-secrecy capacity (or simply (i)-capacity) of the
wiretap channel W as
C(i)(W) := C
(i)
0 (W). (18)
4We note that the error probability is allowed to be any
number in [0, 1) but the secrecy metric is required to tend
to zero as the blocklength grows. From the ordering of the
secrecy metrics in (11), we know that for every ε ∈ [0, 1), we
have
C(i)ε (W) ≤ C(j)ε (W), if i ≤ j. (19)
For the definition of the partial strong converse property,
we find it useful to first consider optimistic analogues [16,
Def. 3.9.1] [21, Thm. 4.3] [22, Thm. 7] of fundamental limits,
such as the capacity in Definition 3.
Definition 4. Let ε ∈ (0, 1] and i ∈ [1 : 6]. Let R ∈ R be
called an (ε, i)-optimistically achievable rate for the general
wiretap channel W if for all sequences of (n,Mn, εn, δn)-
wiretap codes for secrecy metric i satisfying
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R and lim
n→∞
δn = 0, (20)
we must also have
lim inf
n→∞
εn ≥ ε. (21)
Define the (ε, i)-optimistic secrecy capacity (or simply (ε, i)-
optimistic capacity) of the wiretap channel W as
C
(i)
ε (W) := inf{R : R is (ε, i)-optimistically achievable}.
(22)
Define the (i)-optimistic secrecy capacity (or simply (i)-
optimistic capacity) of the wiretap channel W as
C
(i)
(W) := C
(i)
1 (W). (23)
Following [23], and by contrapositive, we note that the
(ε, i)-optimistic capacity can equivalently be defined as the
supremum of all numbers R ∈ R for which there exists a
sequence of (n,Mn, εn, δn)-wiretap codes for secrecy metric
i such that
lim inf
n→∞
εn < ε, lim
n→∞
δn = 0, and lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R.
(24)
The first condition in (24) explains the term optimistic. Indeed,
by the definition of lim inf the error probability is only
required to be smaller than ε for infinitely many n as opposed
to for all sufficiently large n, implied by the first condition
in (16) for the (pessimistic) capacity. Note that our definition
of the optimistic capacity in Definition 4, or equivalently the
conditions in (24), is slightly different from those in Chen
and Alajaji [21, Def. 4.9] and Steinberg [22, Thm. 7]. Our
definition has the advantage that it allows us to characterize
the (ε, i)-optimistic secrecy capacity as an equality for all
ε ∈ (0, 1]. We refer the reader to [14, Sec. IV] and [16,
Rmk. 1.6.3] for a discussion of this subtlety.
From the ordering of the secrecy metrics in (11), we know
that for every ε ∈ (0, 1], we have
C
(i)
ε (W) ≤ C
(j)
ε (W), if i ≤ j. (25)
It is also easily seen from the definitions that for all i ∈ [1 : 6],
C(i)(W) ≤ C(i)(W). (26)
Equality in (26) is particularly significant as can be seen from
the following definition.
Definition 5. A wiretap channel W is said to satisfy the partial
strong converse under secrecy metric i ∈ [1 : 6] if
C(i)(W) = C
(i)
(W). (27)
The qualifier partial is used because we still insist that
the information leakage, represented by δn, tends to zero.
The strong converse thus only pertains to the probability of
decoding error in (14). This definition of the partial strong
converse corresponds to that presented by Han [16, Sec. 3.7]
and Hayashi and Nagaoka in [24]. Clearly, if W satisfies the
partial strong converse under secrecy metric i, both C(i)ε (W)
and C(i)ε (W) do not depend on ε. More precisely, the partial
strong converse implies that
C(i)ε (W) = C
(i)(W) ∀ ε ∈ [0, 1) and (28)
C
(i)
ε (W) = C
(i)
(W) ∀ ε ∈ (0, 1]. (29)
However, as discussed in [16, Rmk. 3.5.1], Definition 5
implies (28)–(29) but not the other way round.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our results. First, we generalize the
results in [6], [17] and characterize C(i)ε (W) and C(i)ε (W)
for general wiretap channels. We then state our main result,
namely that degraded DM-WTC admit the partial strong
converse. We also show that certain classes of non-stationary
wiretap channels and the Gaussian wiretap channel possess
the partial strong converse property.
A. Basic Quantities in Information Spectrum Analysis
To state our results concisely, we recall some definitions
from information spectrum analysis [16], [25]. For a general
sequence of random variables B = {Bn}n∈N, define
ε- p-lim inf
n→∞
Bn :=sup
{
r : lim sup
n→∞
Pr(Bn ≤ r)≤ε
}
(30)
for ε ∈ [0, 1), and
ε- p-lim sup
n→∞
Bn :=sup
{
r : lim inf
n→∞
Pr(Bn ≤ r)<ε
}
(31)
for ε ∈ (0, 1]. Notice the strict inequality in (31), which
differs from the non-strict inequality in (30). The p-lim inf
and p-lim sup are defined as 0-p-lim inf and 1-p-lim sup
respectively. For any general pair of random variables (V,Y)
with joint distribution PVY := {PV nY n}n∈N, define, for each
n, the normalized information density random variables
ın(V
n;Y n) :=
1
n
log
PY n|V n(Y
n|V n)
PY n(Y n)
. (32)
Given {ın(V n;Y n)}n∈N, we may now define
Iε(V;Y) := ε-p-lim inf
n→∞
ın(V
n;Y n) (33)
Iε(V;Y) := ε-p-lim sup
n→∞
ın(V
n;Y n) (34)
5The properties of Iε(V;Y) and Iε(V;Y) are described in
[25, Sec. 2.4]. When ε = 0 in (33) and ε = 1 in (34), we
leave out the subscripts, i.e., we define
I(V;Y) := I0(V;Y), and I(V;Y) := I1(V;Y). (35)
In information spectrum analysis, I(V;Y) and I(V;Y) are
termed the spectral inf- and sup-mutual information rates re-
spectively. They are respectively the p-lim inf and p-lim sup
of the sequence of random variables {ın(V n;Y n)}n∈N.
B. Capacity and Strong Converse Results for General Wiretap
Channels
The following theorem is a straightforward extension of
the results in [6], [17]. For completeness, a proof sketch is
provided in Section V-A.
Theorem 1 (General Formula). For i ∈ [2 : 6], the (ε, i)-
capacity and the (ε, i)-optimistic capacity of any general
wiretap channel W are
C(i)ε (W) = sup
V−X−(Y,Z)
Iε(V;Y) − I(V;Z), and (36)
C
(i)
ε (W) = sup
V−X−(Y,Z)
Iε(V;Y) − I(V;Z). (37)
The suprema are over the set of all sequences of distributions
PVX = {PV nXn}n∈N or equivalently over all Markov chains2
V − X − (Y,Z) where the distribution of (Y,Z) given X
corresponds to the wiretap channel W.
Using the definition of the partial strong converse in Def-
inition 5, we immediately obtain the following corollary,
applicable only to secrecy metrics Si, i ∈ [2 : 6].
Corollary 2 (General Partial Strong Converse). For any
wiretap channel W and any secrecy metric Si, i ∈ [2 : 6],
the partial strong converse property holds if and only if
sup I(V;Y) − I(V;Z) = sup I(V;Y) − I(V;Z), (38)
where the suprema are understood to be the same as in
Theorem 1.
C. Strong Converse Theorems for Specific Wiretap Channel
Models
1) Degraded Discrete Memoryless Wiretap Channels: A
physically degraded, or simply degraded, wiretap channel W
is one in which for every n ∈ N, and for every (x,y, z) ∈
Xn × Yn ×Zn,
Wn(y, z|x) = Wn1 (y|x)Wn2 (z|y) (39)
for some channels Wn1 : Xn → Yn and Wn2 : Yn → Zn. In
other words, Xn− Y n−Zn forms a Markov chain for every
n ∈ N. A DM-WTC has alphabets X ,Y,Z that are finite sets
and the channel is stationary and memoryless in the sense that
Wn1 (y|x) =
n∏
i=1
W1(yi|xi), and Wn2 (z|y) =
n∏
i=1
W2(zi|yi)
(40)
2The notation A−B−C means that An − Bn − Cn forms a Markov
chain for all n ∈ N.
for every (x,y, z) ∈ Xn×Yn×Zn. It is known from Wyner’s
seminal work on the wiretap channel [4] that the capacity of a
degraded DM-WTC W : X → Y×Z (under the weak secrecy
criterion S4) is
CDMs (W ) := max
PX
I(X ;Y |Z) = max
PX
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z),
(41)
where the mutual information quantities are calculated accord-
ing to Pr(Y = y, Z = z|X = x) = W (y, z|x). The second
equality in (41) follows from the fact that X − Y − Z forms
a Markov chain (degradedness) so I(X ;Y |Z) = I(X ;Y Z)−
I(X ;Z) = I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z). Wyner’s weak converse [4,
Eq. (35) in Sec. IV] assumes that the probability of decoding
error vanishes asymptotically. The first of our main results is
a strengthening of Wyner’s seminal result.
Theorem 3 (Degraded DM-WTCs). Any degraded DM-WTC
W : X → Y × Z satisfies the partial strong converse under
any secrecy metric Si, i ∈ [1 : 6]. Consequently, the (i)-
capacities and (i)-optimistic capacities of W = {W} are
equal to CDMs (W ) for all i ∈ [1 : 6].
A proof of this theorem is provided in Section V-B. The
basic idea is to lower bound the (1)-capacity C(1)(W) (ca-
pacity under secrecy metric S1) with CDMs (W ) and to upper
bound the (6)-optimistic capacity C(6)(W) (optimistic capac-
ity under secrecy metric S6) with the same quantity CDMs (W ).
This then allows us to assert that C(1)(W) = C(6)(W)
showing from (19), (25) and (26) that C(i)(W) = C(i)(W)
for all i ∈ [1 : 6], i.e., the partial strong converse holds
under all 6 secrecy metrics. The lower bound of C(1)(W) is
straightforward and follows by using the connection between
secrecy and channel resolvability [6], [17], independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random codes and standard (large
deviation) concentration bounds [26]. This sequence of steps
is already well known. See for example [6, Remark 3] or the
papers by Hayashi [17], [27] and Han et al. [28] on secrecy and
reliability exponents for the wiretap channel. The interesting
part of the proof is in the upper bound of
C
(6)
(W) = sup
V−X−(Y,Z)
I(V;Y) − I(V;Z). (42)
The difficulty arises because we need to upper bound and
subsequently single-letterize the supremum of the difference
between two limit superiors in probability. To perform these
tasks, we leverage the proof technique for [16, Thm. 3.7.2]
and combine several known results and techniques from the
information-theoretic security literature.
2) Non-Stationary Wiretap Channels: The assumption of
degradedness in Theorem 3 is rather strong but appears
essential in the proof. We do not think that the assumption
concerning memorylessness is critical (cf. [23, Cor. 3]), but
we defer the study of wiretap channels with memory to
future work. Instead we examine conditions under which the
stationarity assumption may be relaxed. In this section, we
assume that the wiretap channel is degraded in the sense
of (39) but the components have the following non-stationary
6structure:
Wn1 (y|x) =
n∏
i=1
W1i(yi|xi), and Wn2 (z|y) =
n∏
i=1
W2i(zi|yi).
(43)
That is, the channels themselves may differ across time but
the channel noises are nonetheless independent. We define the
i-th wiretap channel as Wi(y, z|x) :=W1i(y|x)W2i(z|y). The
main and eavesdropper’s channels are defined as WY,i(y|x) :=
W1i(y|x) and WZ,i(z|x) :=
∑
y∈YW1i(y|x)W2i(z|y) respec-
tively. These channels have Shannon capacities C(WY,i) and
C(WZ,i) respectively. We further assume that all component
channels {WY,i}i∈N and {WZ,i}i∈N are weakly symmetric
[2, Def. 3.4]. Recall that a discrete memoryless channel
V : X → Y is weakly symmetric if the rows of the channel
transition probability matrix are permutations of each other
and the column sums
∑
x∈X V (y|x) are independent of y.
Under the condition that the channels are degraded and weakly
symmetric, Leung-Yan-Cheong [29] (also see [2, Prop. 3.2])
showed that the secrecy capacity is the difference of the
capacities of the main and eavesdropper’s channels, i.e.,
CDMs (Wi) = C(WY,i)− C(WZ,i). (44)
Note that (44) is a consequence of the fact that the (unique)
capacity-achieving input distributions of the channels WY,i
and WZ,i are the same and, in particular, they are uniform
on X . See van Dijk [30] for further discussions. With these
preparations, we are in a position to state the following result:
Theorem 4 (Non-Stationary Wiretap Channels). Consider the
degraded, discrete, memoryless but non-stationary wiretap
channel in (43). Assume that all {WY,i}i∈N and {WZ,i}i∈N
are weakly symmetric channels. Under any secrecy metric
Si, i ∈ [1 : 6], the partial strong converse holds for W =
{Wn}n∈N if the following limits exist:
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WY,i), and lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i). (45)
The proof of this theorem can be found in Section V-C.
For the purposes of comparison, consider a point-to-point,
discrete, memoryless and non-stationary channel V n(y|x) =∏n
i=1 Vi(yi|xi). Let PY¯i be the unique [31, Cor. 2 to
Thm. 4.5.2] capacity-achieving output distribution of Vi. It
satisfies PY¯i(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y if all outputs are
reachable [31, Cor. 1 to Thm. 4.5.2]. Further assume that3
sup
i∈N
max
x∈X
Var
[
log
Vi(Y |x)
PY¯i(Y )
]
<∞. (46)
Then, it is easy to show from the strong converse theorem for
general channels [16, Thm. 3.5.1] and the relation between
limits in probability and usual limits [16, Thm. 3.5.2] that the
strong converse for V := {V n = ∏ni=1 Vi}n∈N holds if and
only if
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(Vi) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(Vi). (47)
3This condition is automatically satisfied by weakly symmetric channels as
PY¯i(Y ) = 1/|Y| with probability one for all i. Indeed, (46) is satisfied if the
minimum values of the capacity-achieving output distributions are uniformly
bounded away from zero, i.e., infi∈N miny∈Y PY¯i(y) > 0.
In other words, limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 C(Vi) exists. Indeed, the
left-hand-side of (47) is the capacity [16, Rmk. 3.2.3] of
the channel V, while if we assume (46), the right-hand-
side is the optimistic capacity (a statement generalizing [25,
Example 5.14]). Thus, the equivalent condition in terms of the
existence of the limits of the Cesa`ro means 1
n
∑n
i=1 C(WY,i)
and 1
n
∑n
i=1 C(WZ,i) in Theorem 4 is a generalization of
channels without secrecy constraints to degraded (but weakly
symmetric) wiretap channels.
Of course, the existence of the two limits is only a sufficient
condition for the partial strong converse to hold. It appears to
be rather challenging to assert that it is also necessary, or to
find an alternate (and stronger) characterization that is both
necessary and sufficient.
3) Gaussian Wiretap Channels: We now demonstrate that
the assumption of discreteness in Theorem 3 is not critical. In
fact, we can make a partial strong converse statement for the
(memoryless, stationary) G-WTC in which all the alphabets
are the real line R and the channel laws are
WY(y|x) := N (y;x, σ21), and WZ(z|x) := N (z;x, σ22),
(48)
and we assume that σ2 > σ1. Observe that by defining
W1(y|x) = WY(y|x) and W2(z|y) := N (z; y, σ22 − σ21), we
see that the G-WTC W (y, z|x) = W1(y|x)W2(z|y) is de-
graded. In fact, to be more precise, it is stochastically degraded
but we will not differentiate between physical degradedness
and stochastic degradedness since the capacities and optimistic
capacities are identical, a direct consequence of [3, Lem. 2.1].
For every blocklength n ∈ N, the input codeword Xn is
required to satisfy the almost sure power constraint
Pr(Xn ∈ Fn) = 1 (49)
where
Fn := {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖22 ≤ nS} (50)
is the (n − 1)-sphere with radius √nS and S > 0 is
the permissible power. Recall from Leung-Yan-Cheong and
Hellman [18] that the capacity of the G-WTC, under secrecy
metric S4 (weak secrecy) and assuming that the probability of
decoding error vanishes asymptotically, is
CGs (W ;S) :=
1
2
log
(
1 +
S
σ21
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
S
σ22
)
. (51)
Thus the capacity of the G-WTC is the difference between the
Shannon capacities of the main and eavesdropper’s channels.
We strengthen the main result in [18] as follows:
Theorem 5 (Gaussian Wiretap Channels). The (memoryless,
stationary) G-WTC satisfies the partial strong converse under
any secrecy metric Si, i ∈ [1 : 6]. Consequently, the (i)-
capacities and (i)-optimistic capacities of W = {W} under
the cost constraint in (49) are equal to CGs (W ;S) for all
i ∈ [1 : 6].
The proof of this theorem, which builds on that of Theo-
rem 3, is provided in Section V-D.
One of the additional complications (vis-a`-vis Theorem 3)
we have to overcome is the need to carefully handle the
7almost sure cost constraint in (49) to ensure the statement
holds for S1. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5, one can
show, using the discretization procedure outlined in Han et
al. [28, Sec. VI], that the degraded Poisson wiretap channel,
studied by Laourine and Wagner [32], admits a partial strong
converse.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proved partial strong converse theorems for
various classes of degraded wiretap channels, including DM-
WTCs and G-WTCs. We discuss three promising avenues for
further research.
First, in this paper, we were only concerned with the
transmission of a single message from the sender to the
legitimate receiver. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [5] considered the
broadcast channel with confidential messages model in which
two messages are to be sent, both to the legitimate receiver and
only one to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper’s signal is to
be asymptotically independent of the non-intended message. It
may be possible to prove a partial strong converse in this multi-
terminal system but we note that the information spectrum
technique does not extend in a straightforward manner to show
that discrete memoryless multi-terminal systems, such as the
multiple-access channel [33], admit the strong converse thus
new techniques must be developed.
Second, as in [23], it may be possible to use the tech-
niques contained herein to study wiretap channels with limited
memory (such as channels with additive Markov noise) and
show that they admit a partial strong converse. However,
wiretap channels with Markov memory have not been studied
previously.
Finally, and most ambitiously, it would be interesting to
study whether a full, and not partial or pretty [10], strong con-
verse holds for some classes of wiretap channels, i.e., whether
the capacity depends on (ε, δ) for ε + δ < 1. However, this
appears to require general capacity formula with non-vanishing
error probability and non-vanishing leakage, which in turn
requires the evaluation a convenient non-asymptotic converse
bound for channel resolvability. Initial work on refinements of
non-asymptotic and asymptotic channel resolvability bounds
has been conducted by Watanabe and Hayashi [34]. On a
separate note, one-shot (non-asymptotic) bounds on the wire-
tap capacity for non-zero (ε, δ) were proved by Renes and
Renner [11] using min- and max-entropy calculus.
V. PROOFS
A. Proof Sketch of Theorem 1
Proof: We prove the achievability statement for the
strongest secrecy metric S2 and the converse statement for
the weakest secrecy metric S6.
For achievability, fix a sequence of input distributions
PVX = {PV nXn}n∈N. For each message m ∈ [1 : Mn],
generate a subcodebook C(m) consisting of M˜n/Mn randomly
and independently generated sequences v(l), l ∈ [1 + (m −
1)M˜n/Mn : mM˜n/Mn], each according to PV n . The code-
book is revealed to all parties including the eavesdropper.
Given m ∈ [1 : Mn], the encoder chooses an index L
uniformly at random from [1 + (m− 1)M˜n/Mn : mM˜n/Mn]
and generates x(m) ∼ PXn|V n(·|v(L)) as the channel input.
Let γ > 0. Given y ∈ Yn, the legitimate receiver finds
the unique message mˆ such that (v(l),y) ∈ T (n)γ for some
v(l) ∈ C(mˆ), where
T (n)γ :=
{
(v,y) :
1
n
log
PY n|V n(y|v)
PY n(y)
≥ 1
n
log M˜n + γ
}
.
(52)
Let εn be the average error probability of the legitimate
receiver (over the random message and the random code) given
by (14). By a standard calculation, we have
εn ≤ PV nY n
(
(Vn × Yn) \ T (n)γ
)
+ exp(−nγ). (53)
From ε-capacity [16, Sec. 3.4] and ε-optimistic capacity
analysis [21, Thm. 4.3] (or simply by applying the definitions
of T (n)γ , Iε and Iε to (53)), we know that if M˜n is chosen
such that
1
n
log M˜n ≤ Iε(V;Y) − 2γ, (54)
then lim supn→∞ E[εn] ≤ ε, where the expectation is over
the random code. Similarly if M˜n is chosen such that
1
n
log M˜n ≤ Iε(V;Y) − 2γ, (55)
then lim infn→∞ E[εn] < ε. From the secrecy from resolv-
ability condition in [6, Lem. 2], we know that if
1
n
log M˜n − 1
n
logMn ≥ I(V;Z) + 2γ (56)
then limn→∞ E[S2] = 0. Now because averaged over the
random code, S2 tends to zero, by a Markov inequality
argument (see proof of [35, Thm. 1] for example), there exists
a sequence of codes such that both the reliability and security
conditions are satisfied. This completes the direct part of
Theorem 1 upon eliminating M˜n from the above inequalities,
taking lim infn→∞, and finally taking γ ↓ 0.
For the converse, by using the Verdu´-Han lemma [14,
Lem. 4] we know that if lim supn→∞ εn ≤ ε, for every γ > 0,
we must have that
1
n
logMn ≤ Iε(V;Y) + γ, (57)
for some chain V −X − (Y,Z) and all n sufficiently large
(depending on γ). The auxiliary random process V represents
the sequence of messages which are uniform on the message
sets {Mn}n∈N. Similarly, if lim infn→∞ εn < ε, we must
have that
1
n
logMn ≤ Iε(V;Y) + γ. (58)
Furthermore, [36, Lem. 4] tells us that if S6 → 0, we must
have that
I(V;Z) = 0. (59)
This follows directly from the definition of S6 in (10) and
the spectral sup-mutual information rate. Subtracting I(V;Z)
from (57) and (58), maximizing over all chains V−X−(Y,Z)
to make the bound code-independent, and finally taking
lim infn→∞ and γ ↓ 0 completes the converse proof of
Theorem 1.
8B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Here we prove that any degraded DM-WTC
W : X → Y ×Z satisfies the partial strong converse for any
secrecy metric i ∈ [1 : 6]. We proceed in two steps. First, we
show that C(1)(W) ≥ CDMs (W ) (where W is the stationary,
memoryless channel induced by W ) and second, we show that
C
(6)
(W) ≤ CDMs (W ).
To show that C(1)(W) ≥ CDMs (W ), we adopt the strategy
in [6, Sec. V.C]. Particularize the supremum over PVX by
choosing V = X and PX to be a sequence of product dis-
tributions induced by any PX¯ ∈ argmaxPX∈P(X ) I(X ;Y |Z).
Then, it suffices to appeal to [6, Rmk. 3] which says that if
qn := Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|Xn)
PZn(Zn)
≥ 1
n
log
M˜n
Mn
− γ
)
(60)
decays exponentially in n then S1 → 0. This remark was
also made by Kobayashi et al. [37, Sec. V], and is a simple
consequence of a bound presented by Csisza´r in [20, Lem. 1]
relating mutual information to variational distance. Choose
M˜n to be the smallest integer exceeding exp[n(I(X ;Y )−2γ)]
(so the decoding error probability tends to zero), and choose
Mn to be the largest integer smaller than exp[n(I(X ;Y ) −
I(X ;Z)− 4γ)] = exp[n(CDMs (W )− 4γ)]. The mutual infor-
mations are computed with respect to the distribution PX¯×W .
Now, we see that (60) indeed decays exponentially (Chernoff
bound) and so C(1)(W) ≥ CDMs (W )− 4γ. Finally, let γ ↓ 0.
Now, we prove that C(6)(W) ≤ CDMs (W ). Starting
from (42), for every Markov chain V−X− (Y,Z), we have
I(V;Y) − I(V;Z) ≤ I(V;Y,Z) − I(V;Z) ≤ I(V;Y|Z)
(61)
where the final inequality follows from the sub-additivity of
p-lim sup [16, Sec. 1.3], i.e., that
p-lim sup
n→∞
(An+Bn) ≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
An+p-lim sup
n→∞
Bn. (62)
We further upper bound I(V;Y|Z) in (61). By a conditional
version of the data processing inequality [14, Thm. 9],
I(V;Y|Z) ≤ I(X;Y|Z) (63)
because V −X− (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain. Thus,
C
(6)
(W) ≤ sup
X
I(X;Y|Z) (64)
for any general wiretap channel W = {Wn}n∈N. Now,
it suffices to simplify the spectral sup-conditional mutual
information rate in (64) and, in particular, to show that
sup
X
I(X;Y|Z) ≤ CDMs (W ), (65)
where CDMs (W ) is the capacity of the degraded DM-WTC
defined in (41). At this point, we note that Koga and Sato [38]
argued (without proof) that supX I(X;Y|Z) ≤ CDMs (W ) for
degraded DM-WTCs, but (65) is stronger as we optimize the
spectral sup- (instead of the spectral inf-) conditional mutual
information rate. Hence, an immediate corollary of (65) is
Koga and Sato’s claim [38]. For this purpose, define the
conditional channel
WY|Z(y|x, z) := W (y, z|x)∑
y∈YW (y, z|x)
. (66)
We proceed to show (65) by first considering the sequence of
random variables
ın(X
n;Y n|Zn) := 1
n
log
WnY|Z(Y
n|Xn, Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn) (67)
where X = {Xn}n∈N is an arbitrary input that induces
the output random variables (Y,Z) = {(Y n, Zn)}n∈N. Let
PY¯ Z¯ ∈ P(Y ×Z) be a single-letter capacity-achieving output
distribution, i.e., a distribution on Y × Z such that
PY¯ Z¯(y, z) :=
∑
x∈X
PX¯(x)W (y, z|x) (68)
for some PX¯ ∈ P(X ) that achieves the max in (41). By the
same logic as [31, Cor. 2 to Thm. 4.5.2], PY¯ |Z¯ is unique. In
contrast, PZ¯ is not necessarily unique but, as we will see, this
is inconsequential for the subsequent derivations.
For simplicity in notation, define
(X) := p-lim sup
n→∞
ın(X
n;Y n|Zn), (69)
where X is an arbitrary input process. Since the p-lim sup is
sub-additive as in (62), by introducing the product distribution
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
, we obtain
(X) = p-lim sup
n→∞
(
1
n
log
WnY|Z (Y
n|Xn, Zn)
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
(Y n|Zn)
− 1
n
log
PY n|Zn(Y
n|Zn)
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
(Y n|Zn)
)
(70)
≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
WnY|Z(Y
n|Xn, Zn)
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
(Y n|Zn)
− p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
PY n|Zn(Y
n|Zn)
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
(Y n|Zn) . (71)
The final term is non-negative following [16, Lem. 3.2.1] and
hence
(X) ≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
WnY|Z(Y
n|Xn, Zn)
Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
(Y n|Zn) . (72)
Now let Xn = (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
n ), Y n = (Y
(n)
1 , . . . , Y
(n)
n )
and Zn = (Z(n)1 , . . . , Z
(n)
n ) for each blocklength n ∈ N. Since
the channel Wn and the conditional capacity-achieving output
measure Pn
Y¯ |Z¯
are memoryless,
(X) ≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (X
(n)
i ) (73)
where the information density random variables L(n)i (xi) are
defined as
L
(n)
i (xi) := log
WY|Z(Y
(n)
i |xi, Z(n)i )
PY¯ |Z¯(Y
(n)
i |Z(n)i )
. (74)
9Now by a result of Yasui et al. [39, Lem. 1], we know that
for every x ∈ X ,
E
[
log
WY|Z(Y |x, Z)
PY¯ |Z¯(Y |Z)
]
≤ CDMs (W ) (75)
where (Y, Z)|{X = x} ∼ W (·, ·|x). This follows from the
KKT conditions and straightforward differentiation of mutual
information with respect to the input distribution (cf. [31,
Thm. 4.5.1]). Note that we used the fact that W is degraded
to establish (75). From (75) and the definition of L(n)i (xi)
in (74), for every x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, we have
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (xi)
]
≤ CDMs (W ). (76)
Because we fixed a deterministic x and the channel is mem-
oryless, the random variables (Y (n)i , Z
(n)
i ), i = 1, . . . , n are
independent under the channel Wn(·, ·|x). By memorylessness
and Chebyshev’s inequality, for every γ > 0,
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (xi)≥CDMs (W )+γ
∣∣∣∣Xn=x
)
≤ σ
2
0
nγ2
, (77)
where the constant σ20 is defined as
σ20 := max
x∈X
Var
[
log
WY|Z(Y |x, Z)
PY¯ |Z¯(Y |Z)
]
. (78)
The constant σ20 is finite because PY¯ |Z¯(y|z) is positive for
all (y, z) in view of (75) and the finiteness of CDMs (W ) ≤
min{log |X |, log |Y|}. Since (77) is true uniformly over every
x ∈ Xn, we may average it over x to obtain
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (X
(n)
i ) ≥ CDMs (W ) + γ
)
≤ σ
2
0
nγ2
. (79)
The upper bound σ20/(nγ2) clearly tends to zero as n → ∞.
From the definition of p-lim sup and L(n)i (X
(n)
i ), we have
p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WY|Z(Y
(n)
i |X(n)i , Z(n)i )
PY¯ |Z¯(Y
(n)
i |Z(n)i )
≤CDMs (W )+γ.
(80)
Consequently, from (72) and (73), this proves that
sup
X
I(X;Y|Z) ≤ CDMs (W ) + γ. (81)
Since γ is arbitrary, we may take γ ↓ 0. That is, we have
proved the claim in (65), completing the proof of the partial
strong converse for degraded DM-WTCs.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: We assume that the limits in (45) exist. We will
prove that
C(1)(W) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WY,i)−lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i)
(82)
as well as
C
(6)
(W) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
CDMs (Wi). (83)
Indeed, if the limits in (45) exist, it is easy to see from (44)
that the right-hand-sides of (82) and (83) are equal and thus
C(1)(W) = C
(6)
(W). This implies that C(i)(W) = C(i)(W)
for all i ∈ [1 : 6], i.e., the partial strong converse holds for
secrecy metrics Si, i ∈ [1 : 6].
For inequality (82), we first show the weaker statement:
C(2)(W) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WY,i)−lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i).
(84)
For this purpose, we follow the steps in the proof of [40,
Cor. 3] for the non-stationary Gel’fand-Pinsker channel. Par-
ticularize the optimization over V −X − (Y,Z) to V = X
being uniform on Xn for every n ∈ N. Invoking Theorem 1,
we then find
C(2)(W)
≥ p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
WnY (Y
n|Xn)
PY n(Y n)
− p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|Xn)
PZn(Zn)
(85)
= p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WY,i(Yi|Xi)
PYi(Yi)
− p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WZ,i(Zi|Xi)
PZi(Zi)
(86)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WY,i)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i) (87)
where (86) follows from memorylessness and (87) follows
from Chebyshev’s inequality and the fact that the alphabets
are finite. See [16, Eq. (3.2.15)] for a similar statement.
Now, we prove the stronger statement in (82) concerning
C(1)(W). Given we have proved (84), it suffices [6, Rmk. 3]
to verify that qn in (60) (which controls the variational
distance) converges to zero with rate O(1/n2). This is because
according to [20, Lem. 1],
I(M ;Zn) ≤ V(PMZn , PM×PZn) log |Mn|
V(PMZn , PM × PZn) .(88)
Since log |Mn| is linear in n (cf. (16) and (20)), if the
variational distance V(PMZn , PM×PZn) decays as O(1/n2),
the mutual information I(M ;Zn) decays as O(1/n). Choose
X = {Xn}n∈N such that Xn is uniform on Xn for each
n. In addition, if we choose M˜n in (60) to be the smallest
integer exceeding exp[n(I(X;Y) − 2γ)], and Mn to be the
largest integer smaller than exp[n(I(X;Y)− I(X;Z)− 4γ)],
we have
qn ≤ Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|Xn)
PZn(Zn)
≥ I(X;Z) + γ
)
. (89)
Furthermore, by the same argument that led to (87), we notice
that with Xn uniform on Xn,
I(X;Z) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i). (90)
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Thus, for every γ > 0, there exists an integer N ′γ such that
for all n > N ′γ ,
I(X;Z) +
γ
2
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
C(WZ,i). (91)
Uniting (89) and (91) and invoking the memorylessness of
WnZ , we have
qn ≤ Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
log
WZ,i(Zi|Xi)
PZi(Zi)
− C(WZ,i)
)
≥ γ
2
)
.
(92)
To prove that qn = O(1/n2), we use a similar proof strategy
as the strong law of large numbers assuming finite fourth
moments (e.g., [41, Thm. 2.3.5]). To simplify notation, define
the zero-mean, independent (but not identically distributed)
random variables
Ji := log
WZ,i(Zi|Xi)
PZi(Zi)
− C(WZ,i). (93)
Then by Markov’s inequality, we have
qn ≤ Pr
(( 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ji
)4
≥ γ
4
16
)
≤ 16
n4γ4
· E
[( n∑
i=1
Ji
)4]
.
(94)
When we expand (
∑n
i=1 Ji)
4 and take expectation, the only
terms with E[Ji1Ji2Ji3Ji4 ] 6= 0 are the ones where i1, . . . , i4
are all equal, or they take on two distinct values with each
value repeated twice among i1, . . . , i4. In other words,
E
[( n∑
i=1
Ji
)4]
=
n∑
i=1
E[J4i ] + 6
∑
1≤i<j≤n
E[J2i ]E[J
2
j ]. (95)
Now we must argue that each of the terms E[Jki ] for k = 2, 4
is uniformly bounded in i (but possibly dependent on |X |
and |Z|). Then, because of the normalization by n4 in (94),
we have the desired convergence rate of qn. Indeed, it is
easy to see that for this assertion to be true, it suffices to
show that the first four moments of the information density
random variable logWZ,i(Zi|Xi)− logPZi(Zi) are bounded
(since the capacity terms in (93) are uniformly bounded).
Now, note that PZi(z) = 1/|Z| for all z ∈ Z by the weak
symmetry of the channels. Hence, it suffices to show that
E[(logWZ,i(Zi|Xi) + log |Z|)k] are uniformly bounded for
each k ∈ [1 : 4]. However, it then suffices to verify that
E[logkWZ,i(Zi|Xi)] are uniformly bounded. This immedi-
ately follows from the fact that u ∈ [0, 1] 7→ |u logk u| is
bounded above by e−kkk (assuming natural logs).
Now we prove inequality (83). By using (75), we know that
for every x ∈ Xn,
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (xi)
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
CDMs (Wi), (96)
where the random variable
L
(n)
i (xi) := log
WY|Z,i(Y
(n)
i |xi, Z(n)i )
PY¯ |Z¯,i(Y
(n)
i |Z(n)i )
(97)
and WY|Z,i : X × Z → Y and PY¯ |Z¯,i : Z → Y are induced
by Wi : X → Y×Z . Note that we leveraged the degradedness
of the channels {Wi}i∈N to arrive at (96). Define
C‡ := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
CDMs (Wi). (98)
By the definition of lim sup, for every γ > 0, there exists an
integer Nγ such that for all n > Nγ , we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
CDMs (Wi) ≤ C‡ + γ. (99)
Uniting (96) and (99), we obtain
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (xi)
]
≤ C‡ + γ, (100)
for all n > Nγ . Let σ20 , analogously to (78), be defined as
σ20 := sup
i∈N
max
x∈X
Var
[
log
WY|Z,i(Y |x, Z)
PY¯ |Z¯,i(Y |Z)
]
. (101)
We would now like to show that σ20 is finite. By Bayes rule
and the degradedness of each channel Wi,
log
WY|Z,i(Y |x, Z)
PY¯ |Z¯,i(Y |Z)
= log
WY,i(Y |x)
PY¯ ,i(Y )
− log WZ,i(Z|x)
PZ¯,i(Z)
.
(102)
By using the fact that Var[A+B] ≤ 2Var[A]+ 2Var[B], it is
enough to show that
Var
[
log
WY,i(Y |x)
PY¯ ,i(Y )
]
, and Var
[
log
WZ,i(Z|x)
PZ¯,i(Z)
]
(103)
are uniformly bounded in i ∈ N. Now note that PY¯ ,i and PZ¯,i
are uniform on Y and Z respectively (by the symmetry of the
channels) so
Var
[
log
WY,i(Y |x)
PY¯ ,i(Y )
]
= Var
[
logWY,i(Y |x)
] (104)
≤ E [log2WY,i(Y |x)] (105)
≤ 4e2 · |Y| (106)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
supu∈(0,1] |u log2 u| ≤ 4e2. A similar calculation can be done
for the second term in (103). Thus σ20 is finite.
By Chebyshev’s inequality and (100) (the same logic that
led to (77)), we have
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (xi) ≥ C‡ + 2γ
∣∣∣∣Xn = x
)
≤ σ
2
0
nγ2
, (107)
for all n > Nγ and all x ∈ Xn. It is also true that
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
L
(n)
i (X
(n)
i ) ≥ C‡ + 2γ
)
≤ σ
2
0
nγ2
, (108)
holds for all n > Nγ . By the definition of p-lim sup and
L
(n)
i (X
(n)
i ),
p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WY|Z,i(Y
(n)
i |X(n)i , Z(n)i )
PY¯ |Z¯,i(Y
(n)
i |Z(n)i )
≤ C‡ + 2γ.
(109)
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Finally, from (72), we have
C
(6)
(W) ≤ sup
X
I(X;Y|Z) ≤ C‡ + 2γ. (110)
Since this holds for all γ > 0, we may take γ ↓ 0 to complete
the proof of (83).
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we show that
C(1)(W) ≥ CGs (W ;S) and C
(6)
(W) ≤ CGs (W ;S). Note,
however, that the form of the optimistic capacity C(6)(W) in
(42) has to be modified to take into account the cost constraint
Pr(Xn ∈ Fn) = 1 in (49). The optimization over the chain
V−X−(Y,Z) has to be further constrained to all distributions
PVX satisfying Xn ∈ Fn for all n ∈ N.
For the lower bound, C(1)(W) ≥ CGs (W ;S), we need
to show that qn, defined in (60), decays exponentially fast
for an appropriate choice of input distribution. This argument
is adapted from the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 5 in He and
Yener [42]. Fix a constant δ > 0 and define the product
distribution (probability density function)
PX˜n(x) :=
n∏
i=1
N (xi; 0, S − δ). (111)
Now define the input distribution to be
PXn(x) :=
PX˜n(x)
µn
1{x ∈ Fn} (112)
where µn is the normalizing constant that ensures that∫
PXn(x) dx = 1. This is simply a truncated version of the
jointly Gaussian distribution PX˜n in (111). Because of the
constant backoff δ > 0 from the permissible power S in (111),
it can be seen from Cramer’s large deviations theorem on
the real line [26, Sec. 2.2] that µn := PX˜n(Fn) tends to 1
exponentially fast, i.e.,
µn = Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
X˜2i ≤ S
)
≥ 1− exp(−nη1) (113)
for some η1 > 0 depending on δ. By the construction of the
input distribution in (112), Xn ∈ Fn with probability one,
satisfying the almost sure power constraint in (49). Using the
characterization of the variational distance in (3), we have
V(PX˜n , PXn)
=
1
2
∫
Rn
∣∣PX˜n(x)− PXn(x)∣∣ dx (114)
=
1
2
∫
Fn
∣∣PX˜n(x) − PXn(x)∣∣ dx
+
1
2
∫
Fc
n
∣∣PX˜n(x) − PXn(x)∣∣ dx (115)
=
1
2
∫
Fn
PXn(x)
∣∣µn − 1∣∣dx+ 1
2
PX˜n(Fcn) (116)
≤ 1
2
exp(−nη1) + 1
2
exp(−nη1) (117)
= exp(−nη1) (118)
where (116) follows from the definition of PXn(x), and (118)
follows from (113). Consequently,
V(PX˜n ×WnZ , PXn ×WnZ) = V(PX˜n , PXn) (119)
≤ exp(−nη1). (120)
Let (X˜, Z˜) ∼ PX˜1 × WZ , (X˜n, Z˜n) ∼ PX˜n × WnZ and
(Xn, Zn) ∼ PXn × WnZ . By using the characterization of
the variational distance in (2) as well as the bound in (120),
we deduce that for any β ∈ R,∣∣∣∣Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|Xn)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
≥ β
)
− Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ(Z˜
n|X˜n)
PZ˜n(Z˜
n)
≥ β
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ exp(−nη1).
(121)
Define α := 1
n
log(M˜n/Mn)− γ. Let η2 > 0 be an arbitrary
constant for now. The probability qn in (60) can be written
and bounded as
qn = Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ (Z
n|Xn)
PZn(Zn)
≥ α
)
(122)
= Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ (Z
n|Xn)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
− 1
n
log
PZn(Z
n)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
≥ α
)
(123)
≤ Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ (Z
n|Xn)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
− 1
n
log
PZn(Z
n)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
≥ α
and 1
n
log
PZn(Z
n)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
> −η2
)
+ Pr
(
1
n
log
PZn(Z
n)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
≤ −η2
)
(124)
≤ Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ (Z
n|Xn)
PZ˜n(Z
n)
≥ α− η2
)
+ exp(−nη2)
(125)
≤ Pr
(
1
n
log
WnZ (Z˜
n|X˜n)
PZ˜n(Z˜
n)
≥ α− η2
)
+ exp(−nη2) + exp(−nη1) (126)
= Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WZ(Z˜i|X˜i)
PZ˜(Z˜i)
≥ α− η2
)
+ exp(−nη2) + exp(−nη1) (127)
where (126) uses the bound in (121) with the identification
β = α− η2.
Choose M˜n to be the smallest integer exceeding
exp[n(12 log(1 + S/σ
2
1)) − 2γ)]. It can be shown using a
standard change of output measure argument (cf. proof of
direct part of [16, Thm. 3.6.2]) that with PXn as the input
distribution in (112) and with δ set to γ/2, the decoding error
probability tends to zero. Choose Mn to be the largest integer
smaller than exp[n(12 log(1+S/σ
2
1)− 12 log(1+S/σ22)−4γ)] =
exp[n(CGs (W ;S) − 4γ)] and η2 = γ/2. Thus, α − η2 ≥
1
2 log(1 + S/σ
2
2) + γ/2. With these choices,
E
[
log
WZ(Z˜|X˜)
PZ˜(Z˜)
]
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
S − γ/2
σ22
)
, (128)
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and from (127),
qn ≤ Pr
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WZ(Z˜i|X˜i)
PZ˜(Z˜i)
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 +
S
σ22
)
+
γ
2
)
+ exp(−nη2) + exp(−nη1). (129)
By the Chernoff bound [6, Lem. 6], the probability in (129)
tends to zero exponentially fast. Thus, qn tends to zero
exponentially fast, proving the lower bound C(1)(W) ≥
CGs (W ;S) − 4γ. Now take γ ↓ 0 to complete the proof of
the lower bound.
For the upper bound, C(6)(W) ≤ CGs (W ;S), we emulate
the proof of Theorem 3 with the (now) unique capacity-
achieving output distribution PY¯ Z¯ being
PY¯ Z¯(y, z) = N (y; 0, S + σ21)N (z; y, σ22 − σ21). (130)
The derivation up to (73) holds verbatim. So we simply have
to check the condition in (76) (with CGs (W ;S) in place of
CDMs (W )) and the behavior of the variance corresponding
to (78). We first fix an arbitrary sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Fn and study the first two moments of the following informa-
tion density random variable
K(n)(x) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
WY|Z(Y
(n)
i |xi, Z(n)i )
PY¯ |Z¯(Y
(n)
i |Z(n)i )
. (131)
We would like to show that E[K(n)(x)] ≤ CGs (W ;S) and
that the variance of K(n)(x) is O(1/n) uniform on Fn. For
this task, let Nnj (for j = 1, 2) be a sequence of i.i.d. zero-
mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2j . Using the
constraint ‖x‖22 ≤ nS, the fact that σ2 > σ1 (as assumed),
and the form of the output distributions in (130), it can easily
be seen that K(n)(x) can be upper bounded as
K(n)(x) ≤ CGs (W ;S)
+
log e
2(1 + S
σ2
1
)
(
S
σ21
(
1− ‖N
n
1 ‖22
nσ21
)
+
2〈Nn1 ,x〉
nσ21
)
− log e
2(1 + S
σ2
2
)
(
S
σ22
(
1− ‖N
n
2 ‖22
nσ22
)
+
2〈Nn2 ,x〉
nσ22
)
. (132)
Since Nn1 and Nn2 have zero means and covariances σ21 ·In×n
and σ22 · In×n respectively, the expectation of K(n)(x) is
bounded above by CGs (W ;S). The variance of K(n)(x) can
be written and bounded as
Var
[
K(n)(x)
]
= Var
[
1
n
log
WnY (Y
n|x)
Pn
Y¯
(Y n)
− 1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|x)
Pn
Z¯
(Zn)
]
(133)
≤ 2Var
[
1
n
log
WnY (Y
n|x)
Pn
Y¯
(Y n)
]
+ 2Var
[
1
n
log
WnZ(Z
n|x)
Pn
Z¯
(Zn)
]
(134)
≤ (2 log2 e)
(
9S2
4n(S + σ21)
+
σ21S
n(S + σ21)
)
+ (2 log2 e)
(
9S2
4n(S + σ22)
+
σ22S
n(S + σ22)
)
(135)
where (135) follows from direct calculations per [16,
Eq. (3.7.24)] and the fact that x ∈ Fn. We conclude that
uniform over all x ∈ Fn, the variance of K(n)(x) is of the
order O(1/n) (depending only on S, σ21 , σ22) and hence the
Chebyshev argument at the end of the proof of Theorem 3
holds, yielding C(6)(W) ≤ CGs (W ;S) as desired.
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